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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from, .i • * • : ldgment e n t e r e d by the 
H o n i > i" .j b I <••» -I «'.'! *) i<"«i ] " H ,;••) II *"l .i n q , iuidi D i s t r i r t Con rt, 
relative to a wronqfui death action aqainst a non-opera* .., i mineial 
interest owner (Defendant Red D o m e , Inc ) "• l"~ "jwner :f a 
defect i v*-4 f" r op' • ' I l O^IIH I ( fie fen dan i' Ev-? n Anderson/ wniwii the 
decedent was operating at the time of his dedth. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The fo] 1 owi i ig j ssi les ar e presented for review i n thi s appeal: 
1. Is a n o n - o p e r a t i n g m i n e r a 1 i n t e r e s t o w i i e i s i i c h a s 
Defendant Red Dome, Inc., subject to liability for statutory 
nuisance? 
2. Was the question of nuisance properly addressed by the 
trial Court? 
3. Did Defendant Evan Anderson have a duty to warn the 
operator of faulty machinery? 
4. Does the Utah Fencing Statute (Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 40-5-1, 1953 as amended) , apply to open-pit excavations 
such as the one into which the decedent fell? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
The interpretation of Section 40-5-1, and Sections 76-10-801 
and 76-10-803, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
This wrongful death action was brought to recovery damages for 
the death of LeRoy Turnbaugh, who was killed when the front-end 
loader he was operating rolled into an 18 to 20 foot deep open-pit 
mining excavation. Plaintiff's claims were based upon (1) 
Defendant Red Dome's conduct in contributing to, and supporting, a 
nuisance; (2) Defendant Red Dome's violation of Section 40-5-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended (the Utah Fencing Statute); 
and (3) Negligence on the part of Defendant Evan Anderson in 
failing to warn the lessee of the equipment as to the machine's 
potentially lethal mechanical problems (R.l-4). 
In defense of the foregoing claims, Defendant Red Dome denied 
the nuisance allegations, and claimed that even assuming the 
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existence of a nuisance, Plaintiff's claims were barred by the 
doctrines of comparative negligence and assumption of the risk 
(R.5-9). Defendant Red Dome, Inc. further maintained that as a mere 
non-operating mineral interest owner who received $55,000.00 a year 
as a completely unconnected and sterilized onlooker, said Defendant 
owed no duty to LeRoy Turnbaugh and was therefore exempt from the 
statutory nuisance provisions. Relative to the claims based on the 
Utah Fencing Statute, Defendant Red Dome simply took the position 
that the statute did not apply to open-pit excavations such as the 
one into which the decedent fell. Defendant Anderson's defense was 
based upon comparative negligence, assumption of the risk, and the 
alleged absence of any duty as between said Defendant and the 
decedent. 
The Defendants moved for Summary Judgment (R.25-28), which 
Motion was denied (R.93). 
The case was set for a bench trial before the Honorable Ray 
Harding. At the close of trial, Plaintiff moved to amend its 
Complaint to allege the maintenance of a nuisance by Defendant 
Anderson, pursuant to Rule 15 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
Motion was denied (Tr.217-218). 
The Court ruled in favor of both Defendants finding no cause 
of action on the part of the Plaintiff (R.164-166). More 
specifically, the Court concluded that Defendant Red Dome, Inc. did 
not create a nuisance, that Defendant Red Dome, Inc. had no duty 
toward the decedent by virtue of Red Dome's status as a non-
operational mineral interest owner, and that the Utah Fencing 
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Statute does not apply to open-pit excavations such as the one at 
issue. As to Defendant Anderson, the trial Court found that he was 
not negligent. In the trial Court's Memorandum Decision, it did 
not address the issue of whether or not the scene of the accident 
constituted a nuisance, and if so, whether Defendant Red Dome, Inc. 
as owner of the hazardous mining claims, aided in creating, or 
contributed to the nuisance, or supported, continued, or retained 
the nuisance, as specified in the Utah Nuisance Statute (R.164, 
166) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 6, 1983, LeRoy Turnbaugh, a resident of Fillmore, 
Utah, was killed when the front-end loader he was operating rolled 
backwards into an open-pit excavation situated on a mining claim 
owned by Defendant Red Dome, Inc. (Tr.10,11). The loader had been 
leased by Defendant Evan Anderson to the decedent's employer 
(Tr.109, 129). There was no fuel gauge on the loader (Tr.24), and 
the loader apparently ran out of fuel (Tr.23) , thereby rendering 
the brakes and the steering of the loader inoperable (Tr.91). The 
loader rolled backwards (Tr.28) over the vertical edge of a mining 
pit which was 18 to 20 feet deep (Tr.29). The decedent was crushed 
under the loader. 
Defendant Evan Anderson did not inform Don Peterson of the 
fact that when the engine stopped on the loader which killed LeRoy 
Turnbaugh, that, in that event, the steering was not operable nor 
were the brakes (Tr.26). This is of great importance in that there 
was no fuel gauge on this particular machine, and if the machine 
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were to run out of fuel the steering and the brakes became 
inoperable when the engine died. Don Peterson rode with the 
decedent the day before the accident in a loader which was not the 
same as the loader which killed LeRoy Turnbaugh (Tr.117), although 
testimony was that except in size they were similar. Evan Anderson 
testified that he did not indicate to decedent LeRoy Turnbaugh nor 
Don Peterson, decedent's employer, that there was no fuel gauge on 
the subject loader nor that when the subject loader ran out of fuel 
the engine died, thus rendering the steering and braking of the 
machine inoperable (Tr.113). 
Defendant Red Dome, Inc. had an operating agreement with the 
Sorenson Brothers whereby the Sorensons operated the mining 
operation of the property owned by Defendant Red Dome, Inc. and 
paid to Red Dome, Inc. a royalty which in the year 1983 amounted to 
$55,000.00 (Tr.143). 
Mr. Gordon Griffen, the only employee, chief operating officer 
and sole stockholder of Red Dome, Inc. (Tr.131, 132), testified 
that the area containing the mining claims was extremely rough, 
dangerous and could constitute a hazard (Tr.135, 141); however, it 
was of no concern to Red Dome, Inc. (Tr.137, 138). 
The mining claim where the accident occurred was pock-marked 
with pits such as the one in which the decedent was killed (Tr.19), 
yet said mining claims were entirely devoid of berms, fences, 
warning signs, or other safety measures (Tr.31-33, 132, 136-140, 
155-156) to minimize the danger of falling into the hazardous open-
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pit excavations, some of which were within five or six feet off of 
a public roadway. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The nuisance statutes of Utah as set out under Section 76-
10-801 and 76-10-803, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, apply to 
a "mere owner" of real property such as mining property even when 
the said owner is not the operator of the mining property. 
2. If the appellate Court finds that a "mere owner" of 
property, on which there exists a nuisance, can be held liable for 
damage incurred because of such nuisance, then, and in that event, 
this matter should be remanded to the Trial Court for a 
determination of whether or not a nuisance existed in the subject 
case. The Trial Court did not rule on the question of whether or 
not there was a nuisance. The Trial Court in its Memorandum 
Decision treated the nuisance as if it were negligence referring to 
"standard of reasonable care" and "duty toward" the Plaintiff who 
"at the most was upon the property as a licensee." 
3. The Trial Court erred in failing to find that Defendant 
Evan Anderson had a duty to warn the operator or the lessee of his 
machinery that the machinery had a dangerous proclivity which was 
inherent and hidden to the uninitiated. 
4. The Trial Court erred in stating that Section 40-5-1 of 
the Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, the Utah Fencing Statute, 
"does not apply to open-pit excavations, such as the one at issue 
herein, that are relatively shallow and conspicuous to the 
reasonably prudent person." 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
A NON-OPERATING MINERAL INTEREST OWNER SUCH AS DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT RED DOME, INC., IS SUBJECT TO LIABILITY FOR 
STATUTORY NUISANCE IN UTAH. 
The Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision, (R. 165) cites the 
case of Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978) in support of 
its conclusion that "where there is a dangerous condition on one's 
property which is just as observable to an invitee as to the owner, 
the owner has no duty to warn or to protect the invitee except to 
observe the universal standard of reasonable care under the 
circumstances." The Ellertson case involved a landowner who had 
done a rather shoddy job of tying his horse up to a post. The 
tether slipped down to the base of the post and the horse became 
entangled. The landowner asked a passerby to assist him in 
untangling the horse. In the process of trying to untangle the 
horse, it reared and struck the invitee, who then filed an action 
against the landowner. These facts are a far cry from those set 
forth herein, and in fact do not indicate the maintenance of a 
nuisance. The Ellertson action was based upon claims of 
negligence, a breach of duty to exercise ordinary care. 
The trial judge seems to say herein that the Utah nuisance 
statute does not apply because Defendant Red Dome, Inc. owed no 
duty to decedent. That logic seems to ignore the obvious, namely, 
that the statute created the duty because in common law there is no 
duty. 
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The Trial Court cited two Oregon cases, Catale v. Vanport 
Manufacturing, Inc., 738 P.2d 599 (Oregon App. 1987) and Ashland v. 
Pacific Power and Light Company, 395 P.2d 420 (Oregon 1964), which 
cases held that owners who do not retain any right to control the 
property, exercise any control over their property, could not be 
held liable for the death of a child in a pond built by an owner's 
employee who resided on owner's property. The Trial Court states 
in its decision herein, (R. 166), 
"The analogous situation existed here where the owner Red 
Dome, Inc. only collected royalties from those that mined the 
minerals and had no control whatsoever over their operations. 
Red Dome, Inc. cannot therefore be held to answer for any 
alleged negligence or nuisance created by any of the 
successive mining companies that worked upon his land." 
Nuisance is defined at Section 76-10-801, Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as amended, as follows: 
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition 
whatsoever that is dangerous to human life or health or 
renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome. 
(2) Any person whether as owner, agent, or occupant who 
creates, aids in creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or 
who supports, continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty of a 
Class B misdemeanor. (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Gordon Griffen, the sole stockholder of Defendant-
Respondent Red Dome, Inc., (Tr. 132) knew that there was no 
fencing, no barriers, no signs indicating danger, nor berms around 
the lips of the pit in the mining area (Tr. 138) , that he visited 
the area, "probably an average of three times a year," (Tr. 135) 
and responded to a question, "You generally recognize the area of 
the mining claims as being potentially very hazardous, don't you?" 
(Tr. 141) as follows: 
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Answer: If one were to go out there by themselves or 
walk across the area in our claims and outside our claims and 
you happen to trip and fall, I think you would be in trouble. 
If you couldn't get out by yourself, the heat would get you 
one day or the cold get you in the night* I don't think that 
you could — I don't think there is a place there that you 
could easily get to and jump off and hurt yourself. I will 
say maybe you might be able to find a place but on the flat 
generally no. 
Question: There are as Mr. Anderson admitted several 
hundred large pits there. 
Answer: Depends on what you mean by large of course. 
Then at Tr. 142 counsel showed Mr. Griffen Defendants' Exhibit 14 
and asked, 
"Is that typical however of the size of the pits, several 
hundred pits, that were in existence out there? 
Answer: Well, some would be bigger, some would be 
bigger. 
Mr. Griff en stated that from the first of June 1983 through 
the 30th of May (presumably in 1984) his royalty from the operation 
of the mine amounted to $55,000.00, (Tr. 143). 
Mr. Griffen stated, (Tr. 137) that he had licensed the mining 
operation to people who "would operate in a safe and proper 
manner." The safety and operation then became the sole 
responsibility of the people who were mining the property, 
according to Mr. Griffen. Mr. Griffen stated that he left the 
whole question up to the mining operators and the government 
inspectors who were trained in the area of safety. 
When asked, (Tr. 136) 
"Did you in that regard ever establish or seek to establish 
the maintenance of berms or barriers along the highways or 
around any of the open pits? 
Answer: No. That was outside my jurisdiction." 
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The whole of the testimony of Mr. Griff en followed the line 
that indeed the area was one which could be considered dangerous 
but that Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. had "no right" to 
impose itself upon the licensee mining operator in the field of 
safe operation. 
As a matter of fact, the Trial Court ignored the testimony by 
Mr. Griffen to the effect that the operation of the mine "in a safe 
and proper manner" was involved in the licensing agreement between 
Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. and the mining operators (Tr. 
137). Therefore, although the control of the licensee on the 
question of safety was not set out item by item, apparently it did 
exist and the Trial Court was in error to state that Defendant-
Respondent Red Dome, Inc. "had no control whatsoever over their 
operation." Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. really can't be 
bothered with such boring details, but it is submitted that 
$55,000.00 per year is sufficient to go to a modicum of trouble, 
especially when so ordered by statute. 
Utah is a mining state and therefor this Court should give 
careful consideration to the balancing of the equities between the 
mining interests and the rights of the public to a certain amount 
of precautions on the part of mining operators and owners. This is 
especially true where the proximity of a public highway to danger 
appears to be in some cases five or six feet, (R.163, Ex. 8, 17, 
28) . 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING AS TO 
WHETHER OR NOT A NUISANCE EXISTED IN THE SUBJECT CASE, 
The Trial Court did not make a finding as to whether or not 
the situation involving the dangerous pits on the 650 acres of land 
(Tr. 134) did or did not constitute a nuisance but only addressed 
the question of whether or not a nonoperating owner had a duty to 
an invitee. 
In the 1982 case of Radloff vs. State, 323 NW 2d 541, Mich. 
App., the owner of lands leased the lands to a company, which 
company dug a gravel pit which was later filled with water. The 
Court found that the evidence indicated that the State (owner) knew 
that the gravel pit was unsafe for public use but made no effort to 
discourage its use by the public or to contour the embankment to 
make the area safe. The Court found that there was an intentional 
nuisance created and the Court quoted from the case of Denny vs. 
Garavaglia, 52 NW 2d 521, (Mich. 1952), where the Court stated that 
"an intentional nuisance means not that the existence of a nuisance 
was intended by the creator but, rather, that the creator intended 
to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a 
nuisance." 
In 1978 the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Vincent v. Salt 
Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 found that the following instructions to 
the jury given by the Trial Court was a correct statement of the 
law regarding the intentional creation or maintenance of a private 
nuisance, 
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"A nuisance is a condition, not an act or failure to act on 
the part of the person responsible for the condition. If the 
wrongful condition exists, and the person charged therewith is 
responsible for damages to others, although he may have used 
the highest possible degree of care to prevent or minimize the 
deleterious effects. Recovery in an action for a nuisance 
cannot be defeated by showing that there was no negligence on 
the part of the defendant. 
A nuisance does not rest on the degree of care used, for that 
presents a question of negligence, but on the degree of danger 
existing even with the best of care, the question of care or 
one of care is not involved. Thus, a person who creates or 
maintains a nuisance is liable for the resulting injury to 
others, without regard to the degree of care of skill 
exercised by him to avoid the injury, and notwithstanding that 
he exercises reasonable or ordinary care and skill, or even 
the highest possible degree of care." 
Thus it can be seen that the Trial Court herein applied only 
the legal concepts surrounding the law of negligence such as 
standard of care, status of plaintiff (licensee, invitee, 
trespasser, etc.), assumption of the risk, etc. 
The Trial Court seems to be under the impression that the 
absence of a duty on the part of Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, 
and/or the presence of assumption of the risk or contributory 
negligence on the part of Mr. Turnbaugh, is somehow fatal to a 
cause of action based upon statutory nuisance. While this was 
precisely the position taken by counsel for Defendant-Respondent 
Red Dome in his Closing Argument (Tr.220), such notions are 
contrary to current Utah law. Further, it is well established 
under Utah law, that contributory negligence is not a defense to a 
nuisance action, Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 
276 (Ut. 1982). (See also discussion at R.58 herein.) 
The Trial Court did not even address the issue of whether or 
not the conditions created on the land by licensees and supported, 
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continued and retained by Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. did 
in fact constitute a nuisance. The subject case should be remanded 
to the Trial Court for ascertainment of this fact. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE THAT THE FRONTEND LOADER OPERATED BY THE 
DECEDENT WAS DEFECTIVE OR WAS IMPROPERLY MAINTAINED. 
Testimony of Defendant-Respondent Anderson, the owner of the 
machine which decedent was operating at the time of his death, was to 
the effect that the machine was properly maintained by said 
Defendant. In contrast, the testimony of witness Michael James 
Haveron, an ex-employee of Defendant-Respondent Anderson, indicated 
that the so-called maintenance was minimal, to the say the least (Tr. 
97). 
Question: Can you give us a general description of the 
general condition of the loaders that were being utilized by 
Fillmore Products during the time that you were there? 
Answer: The one that I ran was in pretty poor shape. We 
didn't have the money to take care of all the maintenance 
items that it needed. 
Question: Was Mr. Evan Anderson aware of the problems 
with the loaders? 
Answer: Yes 
Question: When you say there were problems with the 
loader you were using but didn't have the money, what types of 
problems were there? 
Answer: There were a lot of hydraulic leaks there common 
with them. We had a pretty big leak with the steering system, 
(Tr. 98). 
Again, the same witness under cross examination by Defendant-
Respondent's counsel at Tr. 102 at Line 11: 
Question: Was it your job also to supervise the 
13 
maintenance of the equipment? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: Then was there a lot of maintenance done on 
the equipment? 
Answer: We did a fair amount. Not everything we needed 
to do because there wasn't enough funds. 
Question: There wasn't any maintenance done? There was 
maintenance done on the loaders? 
Answer: When it came to a shutdown point we do 
maintenance. When the machine would not operate we would fix 
whatever was wrong. 
And again at Tr. 103 on cross examination: 
Question: And what about the operation of just basically 
checking the operation of steering and brakes and so forth, 
whose duty was that to report any problems? 
Answer: They would be reported to me and I would talk to 
Evan about it. 
Question: Who would report to you? 
Answer: The operator, which at the time was Richard 
Scott. It was common knowledge with us all that we had a 
problem with the steering and brakes. The brakes commonly 
Question: Say that again. 
Answer: The steering we knew we had a problem with that 
because it would veer from side to side if you weren't 
accustomed to the play that was in the system and the brakes 
would go out. 
However, regardless of whether or not the maintenance was of a 
high degree, there was an inherent danger with the subject loader in 
that if it ran out of fuel, the engine would stop. If the engine 
stopped, the brakes would cease to work and the steering would cease 
to work (Tr. 25-256) . It was testified by Mr. Anderson that the 
characteristic of the steering failing to work when the engine quit 
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was a characteristic of its manufacture, (Tr. 39) and under cross-
examination at Tr. 40 when asked, 
So when the engine quit and you had no hydraulic pressure 
then you could not steer? 
Answer: That is correct. 
Not only did Mr. Anderson know about these two inherently 
dangerous characteristics of the particular machine but he did not 
point them out to Mr. Don Peterson to whom he was "loaning" his 
machinery. Here it will be noted that Mr. Peterson testified that he 
was allowing Mr. Anderson credit for the money that Mr. Anderson owed 
him for the use of his loader. On direct examination he testified at 
Tr. 109: 
Question: I see. In other words you recall in your 
deposition testifying that you were paying Evan Anderson $15 
to $20 a load, you couldn't remember? 
Answer: Yes, this has been a policy for a long time. I 
have used his loader off and on for four, five or six years, 
the amount of time he was down there. Whenever he did that I 
just put it on his account. 
Question: Instead of actually paying him money, you were 
deducting what he owed you? 
Answer: Right. 
Mr. Anderson not only knew of the above set forth inherently 
dangerous characteristics of the machine, but he did not warn Mr. 
Peterson of the fact. 
Question: Now did you at any time prior to the accident 
advise Don Peterson of the fact that this loader would lose 
its braking capabilities and steering capabilities in the 
event that the motor stopped running? 
Answer: I don't remember that conversation if in fact it 
took place, but, you know, as I say, I had that loader for a 
couple of years before that and Don had used it several times. 
Just a specific conversation as to me telling him the brakes 
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didn"t work after the engine stopped or the steering didn't 
work, I don't remember having that conversation. But Don was 
an experienced operator. Maybe I didn't feel like I had to. 
(Tr. 26-27). 
There was conflicting testimony as to the maintenance, whether 
good or bad, of Defendant Anderson's equipment and as regards the 
credibility of the witnesses, Defendant Anderson was testifying in 
his own behalf whereas the witness Haveron was in no way connected to 
the Plaintiff or the Defendants and as far as could be ascertained 
was a completely unbiased witness. It is submitted that the Trial 
Court's finding of proper maintenance flew directly in the face of 
the evidence. 
Regardless of the maintenance of the loader, the Defendant-
Respondent Anderson was under a duty as a bailor for hire to warn the 
bailee of any inherent defects in the equipment bailed, especially 
when the defects were so crucial to the safe operation of the said 
machine, to-wit brakes and steering. This of course was of much 
larger importance when taken together with the lack of a fuel gauge 
(Tr. 24), meaning that the operator had to stand up to look into the 
overhead opening of the fuel tank to guess if there were or were not 
fuel contained in the said tank. It is submitted that an operator 
could be busy at all times of the operation and could not quickly and 
accurately check the amount of fuel in the tank at a given time. 
The neglect of installing a new fuel gauge, coupled with the 
failure to warn either Peterson or decedent of the inherent dangers 
of the particular loader, constituted culpable negligence on the part 
of Defendant-Respondent Anderson. 
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IV 
THE UTAH FENCING STATUTE, (40-5-1), SHOULD APPLY TO 
OWNERS OF LAND ON WHICH THERE IS AN OPEN-PIT TYPE 
EXCAVATION, 
The scope of the Utah Fencing Statute, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 40-5-1, appears to be an issue of first impression in Utah. 
Since the Statute became law in 1898, it appears to have been cited 
in only one reported Court Opinion, entitled Ewell vs. The United 
States, 579 Fed. Supp. 1291 (CD. Utah, 1984). The Court in that 
case never reached the issue of the scope of the Utah Fencing Statute 
because the Court found that the Defendants therein were immune from 
liability in any event by virtue of the Utah Landowners Liability 
Act, which shields landowners from liability for recreational 
landusers' injuries sustained on the landowners' property. 
In the case at bar the Trial Court concluded that the Utah 
Fencing Statute did not apply to open-pit excavations such as the one 
in which the appellant's deceased husband fell. (R. 165) 
The Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision stated that the 
Ochampaugh vs. City, 588 P.2d 1351 (Wash. 1979) was highly 
"persuasive and cogent in view of the facts set forth in trial in 
this matter." (R. 164) The facts in that case were that two young 
boys drowned in a pond that had been formed many years prior by the 
filling up of an excavation. The Court held that such an excavation 
filled with water was not an "excavation" within meaning of statute 
requiring persons digging, sinking or excavating any "shaft, 
excavation or hole" to fence it so as to securely guard the danger to 
persons and animals falling into such shafts or excavations. 
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The Trial Court herein stated that the same case, to-wit, 
Ochampaugh vs. City, cited an earlier precedent that held that the 
Washington statute applied only to excavations, "the area of which on 
the surface is relatively small and which can be fenced without great 
expense." The actual quote that the Trial Court was referring to was 
from McDermott vs. Kaczmarek, 2 Wash. App. 643, 469 P.2d 191 (1970). 
The actual quote from this case was "that it was meant (the 
Washington fencing statute) to apply only to excavations of the pit 
type, the area of which on the surface is relatively small and which 
can be fenced without great expense. Nothing was said about 
"relatively shallow and conspicuous to the reasonably prudent person" 
as was said by the Trial Court herein. 
The writer has not been able to find a case where a fencing 
statute has been held to apply in mining states to an excavation that 
is filled with water as in the Ochampaugh case or a ditch containing 
water as the Court in Ochampaugh cites the case of Barnhart vs. 
Chicago M & St. Paul R.R., 89 Wash. 304, 154 P.441, a 1916 case. 
This is a case of first impression in Utah, as stated supra, 
but here we do not have a body of water, a mine shaft that had a door 
on it where a boy enters voluntarily; the bad air inside kills the 
boy. Nor is the subject case a large pit that would be completely 
unreasonable to fence, such as Bingham Canyon excavation for 
Kennecott Copper mine. Here we have a relatively short space that 
could be fenced from 90-degree angles from the highway a relatively 
short distance on each side, or as a matter of fact, each excavation 
could be quickly fenced as it was finished, or in the bare minimum, 
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berms could be pushed up to at least two vertical feet surrounding 
each excavation, making it quite a deterrent to rolling into the open 
pit. If a person or animal were walking in this area at night 
without a light, there is no question that the absence of a broken 
leg in a 10-minute walk would be nothing short of a miracle. 
The statute says, "The owner, lessee or agent of any mine who 
by working such mine has caused, or may hereafter cause, the surface 
of the public domain, or of any highway, or other lands, to cave in 
and form a pit or sink into which persohs or animals are likely to 
fall shall cause such pit or sink to be filled up, or to be securely 
enclosed with a substantial fence at least four and one-half feet 
high;...." Here again statute has created a duty where none existed 
at common law. 
It is submitted that it would take more than a strict 
construction of the statute to seriously contend that a cave-in 
appearing on the surface of land caused by underground mining which 
"formed a pit or sink into which persons or animals are likely to 
fall" to be different in legal construction from a mining statute 
designed to protect unwary people and animals where the pit or sink 
was formed by miners working from the surface down. 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of whether or not the frontend loader was properly 
maintained is not dispositive as to the negligence of Defendant-
Respondent Anderson in not apprising Don Peterson or his operator of 
the inherent dangers in the machine that he was renting to them. 
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These dangers were well known to him, and he merely thought that Mr. 
Peterson would know of them, without telling him, of course. 
The Trial Court should be reversed on this holding. 
The facts surrounding the ownership and operation of the 
subject mining claim are that a one-man corporation has been paid 
$55,000.00 a year for a license to mine the said property. The owner 
of this land, or to be more precise, the sole employee, chief 
executive officer and only stockholder of the corporation that is the 
owner of this land shrugs off any concern he should have regarding 
the safety of the open-pit mine operation on his land in a totally 
cavalier fashion. 
The Trial Court is totally convinced that even if there were a 
nuisance, a mere owner and nonoperator of the land would not be 
liable for any damages flowing from a nuisance on the land if indeed 
the nuisance did exist. 
Plaintiff-Appellant submits that it was clear error as a 
matter of law for the Trial Court to substitute a "control test" 
taken from Oregon case law in the place of the clear language of the 
statutory nuisance test in Section 76-10-801, Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as amended, upon which Plaintiff-Appellant has relied since the 
inception of this action. For this reason, this case should be 
remanded with instructions for the Trial Court to determine whether 
Defendant-Respondent Red Dome, Inc. aided in creating, contributed 
to, supported, continued or retained a nuisance in violation of 
statute. 
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An owner, especially one who is cognizant of the danger 
surrounding the mining operation, is liable to the public and to an 
invitee for damage resulting from the maintenance of a nuisance, 76-
10-801, supra, and Vincent v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
Although the fencing statute as set forth in 40-5-1 has been 
around many years, this case is a case of first impression in Utah 
and should stand for the proposition that the person or persons who 
take treasure from the earth should maintain their operation in a 
manner that does not construct "traps for the unwary" or in fact 20-
foot holes that have perpendicular sides and no indication of any 
kind at the lip of such a pit. 
The case should be reversed and remanded for a hearing as to 
the question of damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. M. AMOSS 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
If D. M. Amoss, attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant in the above 
Appeal, certify that on October 7^/ , 1988, four copies of the 
within brief were served upon Defendant-Respondent by mailing them, 
first-class, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Dexter L. Anderson 
Attorney at Law 
S. R. Box 5 2 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
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